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Donald Trump’s shocking victory two years ago was immediately 
followed by strong disapproval from the public and mainstream media, 
much of which remains to this day. What is remarkably missing from 
the reactions, such as the “Not My Presidents Day” protests and the 
media obsession with Trump’s Russian liaison, is a deep reflection on 
the underlying intentions of the white working-class population that 
cast its vote for Trump. 
Perhaps this phenomenon is due to an overemphasis on the rational-
choice model that economists and political scientists too readily 
accept. According to this model, political decisions are captured by 
“vested interests” that are taken as given. Therefore, the rise of Trump 
is a straightforward manifestation of his supporters’ rationality, and 
there is no need to question whether his “America First” and anti-
immigrant policies are truly in agreement with the white working-class 
population’s self-interests. 
In his book, Rodrik criticizes this model in his support for the role 
of “ideas” instead of “interests” in understanding politics. According to 
Rodrik, interests are not fixed, so we must pay attention to how they 
are shaped by our ideas of what they are. Many supporters of Trump, 
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after all, hold highly contradictory beliefs that cannot be explained in 
the standard rational-choice model. For instance, as observed by Arlie 
Hochschild, a UC Berkeley sociologist cited by Rodrik, some of the direct 
victims of pollution from the petrochemical industry in red states were 
surprisingly against the government protection of the environment. 
Inept handling of environmental regulations in the past has left them 
with a deep-seated belief in the total incapability of the government as 
anything other than an institution helping minorities and immigrants 
“cut in line.” The end result was the vehement rejection of government 
by the ones who need it the most. Trump was artful enough to exploit 
this kind of sentiment to devise a narrative that worked in his favor. 
Benign policymakers were not. 
Another problem Rodrik sees in the rational-choice model is that it 
ironically delegitimizes the role of policy recommendation. If special 
interests explain all government actions and eliminate the possibility of 
a sensible policy intervention, the only cure for economic inefficiency 
becomes laissez-faire, of which Rodrik is highly critical. Rodrik’s 
fundamental belief is that the phrase “free market” is a misnomer. 
Markets intrinsically require a set of rules and supporting institutions 
to function, as they are not “self-creating, self-regulating, self-
stabilizing, or self-legitimizing.” Since there is no single principle that 
works everywhere, diverse rules and institutions must be constructed 
within nation-states to best represent their citizens and circumstances. 
Rodrik is not altogether denying the role of interests in politics but is 
paying attention to their occasional flexibility. Compensating victims of 
rising inequality through redistribution, for instance, is not politically 
promising because the implicated interests are too rigid in this case. 
However, provided a prominent role of “ideas” in the political scene, 
bright and benevolent politicians and policymakers can identify the 
areas where interests are malleable. Then, they can devise innovative 
ways to reach an optimal outcome without leaving the elites feeling 
they are worse off, just as Mandela negotiated an end to apartheid by 
guaranteeing rights for the white minority. 
Specifically, as an alternative solution to inequality, Rodrik proposes 
the concept of “innovation state.” As Europe responded to upheavals 
against capitalism in the early twentieth century by creating “welfare 
states,” we can address today’s inequality issue by creating public 
venture funds that would lead to some public ownership in future 
technology developments. Perhaps contrary to popular belief, the role of 
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state-funded R&D and industrial policy in innovation and growth has 
been indispensable, at least in the past several decades (Westphal 1990; 
Mazzucato 2015). This is why, for instance, computer science students 
today study the works of Edsger Dijkstra and Tim Berners-Lee, not 
Steve Jobs and Mark Zuckerberg. Rodrik’s solution aims to prevent all 
of such public contributions from unfairly turning into privatized profits 
within the limits of malleability of interests. However, much contention 
remains regarding under what conditions state intervention could 
lead to success or inefficiency, and this intricate issue requires careful 
analyses, as in the studies of Singh and Bhangoo (2014) and Lee (2016).
In fact, the use of vague language and the tendency to skim over 
contentious topics are the most obvious limitations of this book. 
In response to the worry about inefficiency of government actions, 
Rodrik writes that such issue can be overcome with “clear objectives, 
measurable targets, close monitoring, proper evaluation, well-designed 
rules, and professionalism” without elaborating on any of these 
components. In another discussion on the same topic, he argues that 
the government must be “close enough to private enterprises to elicit 
the requisite information” but not “too close…that they are captured”—
again without further explanation. The real challenge lies in how to 
bring about all these wonderful things. Instead of dedicating so many 
pages to reiterating points that had been dealt with in finer detail in 
his previous books, such as Has Globalization Gone Too Far? and The 
Globalization Paradox, Rodrik could have addressed possible doubts 
against his new proposals. 
Another area where this book falls short is in the concern of fellow 
economists that this book may provide ammunition for protectionists. 
In the preface, Rodrik dismisses this concern by insisting that such 
a risk is present in any argument-making. Although he is certainly 
correct about this point, Rodrik could have done more to alleviate his 
peers’ reasonable apprehension. Lay readers would have to squint to 
deduce that Rodrik in fact supports “maximum globalization” under 
preservation of “national policy space,” as only the latter part is 
emphasized throughout the book. Rodrik’s incaution becomes apparent 
when he defends restrictions on “social dumping,” or imports that 
threaten domestic regulatory system, by claiming that such measures 
would not lead to “more protectionist abuse than current antidumping 
practices already do.” His discussion almost reads as if he accepts the 
status quo of antidumping practices. At the least, since he does not 
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further explain the current antidumping practices, readers without 
much knowledge on this issue would not be left with enough skepticism 
about protectionist policy.
Readers must also keep in mind that Rodrik’s model based on the 
role of “ideas” may work against his own arguments. Rodrik claims 
that events like Brexit and Trump’s victory are revealing “the political 
fragility of the current form of globalization.” However, his model 
permits a possibility that in contrast to what the public perceives, 
globalization did not have much negative impact on the population. As 
most economists agree, lack of national policy space or representation 
crisis caused by “hyper-globalization” may only be a minor contributor 
to the stagnant standard of living of the working-class population in 
developed nations.
Rodrik does briefly recognize this possibility. But he hopes that the 
takeaway message of the book will be that it is better for economists 
to actively engage in the public conversation, albeit with uncertainty 
and disagreements, before the likes of Trump take it over. As major 
challenges await modern capitalism, any reluctance to speak up from 
those who strive to discover and assess the truth about it is too risky. 
At times, Rodrik may seem unfairly critical of economists, especially 
when he singles out economics as a “field that has often lacked much 
self-reflection.” No influential profession is free from attacks, and 
economists must take the heightened criticisms against them as a sign 
of their increased importance in today’s society. Rodrik’s acumen in 
both economics and politics culminates in a precious guide on how they 
can exercise their influence towards the common good more effectively. 
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